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Understanding the origins of the modern state –and the different forms 
these political units eventually took- is a central enterprise in the 
discipline of political science. Relevant not only as a necessary first step in 
the development of several fields inside political science (e.g. how can we 
talk of an international, or better inter-state system, if we do not know 
where this concept of “inter-state” comes from?) but also for the 
contemporaneity of state-building in the 21st century. Pivotal as it is, the 
literature still has too many open-ended pathways and many more to 
discover. It is in this scenario that Thomas Ertman’s Birth of the 
Leviathan appears as a very welcome contribution to the study of the 
origins of the Modern State. 
The problem Ertman poses is not entirely new. In his own words: “Why 
had some states developed in a constitutionalist direction during the 
formative centuries of European state-building, while others had become 
absolutist? And why had military pressures driven some states to 
construct effective, proto-modern bureaucracies, while others remained 
wedded to administrative methods that seemed highly dysfunctional?” (p. 
xi). The resemblance to the questions in which, to take a well-known 
example, Charles Tilly had been working on for a long time is strong. (1) 
Notwithstanding, three features stand out in the Birth of the Leviathan: 
a) the type of intra- and inter-state changes that the author discusses 
along the extended process of state-building (the time frame for the study 
is circa the fall of the Roman Empire and the French Revolution), b) the 
complexity of the theory proposed, and c) the impressive empirical 
research undertaken to support his theory. 
As Ertman’s quote above suggests, the goal of the book is to explain why 
some states developed an absolutist regime while others came up with 
a constitutionalsystem. Moreover, and reaching to Max Weber’s thought, 
the author also provides an answer to the diversity (divergence??) in the 
paths of state infrastructure –that is: why some states ended up with a 
modern bureaucratic administration while others remained, to their own 
detriment, with patrimonial systems. Thus four variables define the 
typology of states presented: patrimonial absolutism (France and Spain), 
bureaucratic constitutionalism (Great Britain), bureaucratic absolutism 
(Germany), and patrimonial constitutionalism (Poland and Hungary). 
There are two sets of dependent variables. The political regime on one 
side – i.e.absolutism and constitutionalism- respond to differences in the 
strength of representative institutions. Grosso modo, polities situated 
inside those territories characterized by large-scale and mostly 
unsuccessful experiments to install homogeneous political regimes during 
the Dark Ages will be more prone to an absolutist regime. (2) On the 
other hand, states on the periphery of these historical processes could 
“begin their state-building from zero” and thus were more prone to 
develop constitutional regimes with strong representative institutions 
that constrained royal power. 
The other dependent variable is the one concerning state-infrastructure. 
This can take the form of patrimonialism or bureaucracy. The core of the 
explanatory or independent variable would be that the states involved in 
early conflict (3) –“early” being defined as pre-1450- tended to build state 
infrastructures with “outmoded and even dysfunctional” institutional 
arrangements (most commonly office-holding and the grant of state 
functions, such as taxing, to private hands). On the contrary, latecomers 
to war were able to take a bureaucratic path for two reasons: a) they could 
benefit from the know-how and learn from the errors of states which had 
been involved in the expansion of the state-authority for a long time, and 
b) the exponential increase in the supply of personnel professionally 
trained to run state affairs. (4) 
 
A problem the author encounters is that this scheme cannot explain two 
of its four cases: bureaucratic-constitutionalism and constitutional-
paternalism. Why did Great Britain follow the bureaucratic path given it 
was a clear case of early state-builder for war purposes? And why is it that 
Hungary and Poland, two cases of latecomers to war, ended up with 
patrimonial administrations? The explanation for this anomaly rests in 
the existence of strong representative institutions that  influenced state 
infrastructure. In the case of Great Britain, redirecting the state in a 
bureaucratic path (against the attempts of interest groups to impose 
patrimonialism), in the cases of Hungary and Poland, acting as an agent 
of patrimonial administration. 
Let me offer some final comments (in an unjustly oversimplified manner) 
that follow from the reading.  
Ertman’s book turns out to be a rigorous and intensely (with historical 
descriptions that might be too dense in some instances) researched study. 
His comprehension of the subtleties of state-building in modern Europe 
certainly surpass most of the work this reader has seen in the literature. 
While the work of a Charles Tilly analyzed the role of war, coercion, and 
capital in trying to explain why such different paths of state-building 
ended up with the same outcome -i.e. the nation-state- Ertman’s book 
goes much deeper. The inclusion of the analysis of changes in the 
domestic structures is particularly welcome. In other words, where Tilly 
saw a path towards convergence in the form of the nation-state, Ertman 
disentangles a process that leads to the formation of critically different 
types of states. This divergence becomes particularly relevant when one 
reflects on the contemporaneity of this work, since it was not only the 
convergence in the nation state form, but also the stark differences –
especially in state infrastructure- that defined and continue to define the 
European countries studied. (5) 
 
Some final thoughts, that would have to be more developed to do the 
author justice, will be irresponsibly thrown as questions for further 
consideration: 
1. The author seems to focus too much in the methods of resource 
extraction (e.g. taxing) without taking seriously the given pool of 
resources each territory had. A better consideration of this issue –
for example benefiting from Tilly’s hypothesis on the importance 
of cities as centers of capital and their interplay with central 
governments- might be a good idea (Was it the same for a King to 
have a Madrid than a Ghent?) 
2. What is the real role of war? The author measures the effectiveness 
of state administration by their fighting performance. But, is losing 
a war, let’s say Jena, a valid yardstick to define efficient and 
inefficient administrations, or as in the case of Jena other things 
might be in play (Napoleon’s mighty army)? 
3. Is it acceptable to have such a flexible theoretical model? Are not 
the explanatory variables modified to fit the cases, thus incurring 
in a grave methodological problem? In general, how heavy are the 
costs in parsimony of such a detailed and complex study? 
In any case, The Birth of the Leviathan is an essential study for anyone 
trying to understand where the central political unit in international 
relations comes from, and why has this institution differed, not only in its 
path –as Tilly tells us- but also in its final form. The interested reader 
should save some time to seriously engage in a dialogue with Ertman and 
his Birth of the Leviathan. 
 
(1) “What accounts for the great variation over time and space in the kinds of states that have 
prevailed in Europe since A.D. 990, and why did European states eventually converge on different 
variants of the national state? Why were the directions of change so similar and the paths so 
different?” Tilly, Charles, “Cities and States in Europe, 1000-1800”; Theory and Society, Vol. 18, 
No. 5, Special Issue on Cities and States in Europe, 1000-1800 (September, 1989, p.565). 
Nevertheless, there is one important distinction between these two questions that will be 
discussed at the end of this essay. 
(2) It is not completely clear though, at least to this reader, the logical explanation for this 
hypothesis. Is it that the post-Dark Ages and its failed attempts to impose working political 
systems (e.g. the Carolingian Empire) generated such a marked decentralization in the political 
landscape that the only viable solution for the Crowns was to try to impose a severe centralization 
over the aristocratic landlords? Or that such decentralization and the pattern of landlord 
aristocracy that followed were not compatible with the bicameral representative organizations 
(typical of constitutional regimes)? Or both? This is particularly troublesome since the author 
defines the variance in political regime as “a ruler who was relatively constrained 
(constitutionalism) or unconstrained (absolutism)” (p. 19). 
(3) Here the author wisely sticks to Tilly’s maxim “War made the state and the state made war.”  
(4) A phenomenon linked to the proliferation of the University as a social institution. 
(5) As the author remarks at the end of the book: “…patrimonial institutions can also have nagging 
long-term consequences. Despite the reforms of the 19th century, patron-client relations, lack of 
clear boundaries between politics and administration, and redistribution of public funds towards 
political insiders remain a serious problem in Spain, Portugal, France, and Italy…” p. 322. 
  
*Ph.D. Student 
Department of Political Science 
University of Pennsylvania. 
Profesor Depto. Estudios Internacionales. FACS - Universidad ORT 
Uruguay.  
MA en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella 
E-mail: gcastro@sas.upenn.edu 
 
 
